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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DANIEL EUGENE PALMER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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NO. 46491-2018
KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR-2017-6029

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Daniel E. Palmer pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance with the intent
to deliver, the district court sentenced him to seven years, with two and one-half years fixed.
Mr. Palmer also moved for reconsideration of his sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35
(“Rule 35”). The district court denied his motion. Mr. Palmer now appeals, and he argues the
district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and denying his Rule 35
motion.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In November 2017, the State charged Mr. Palmer by Information with trafficking in
methamphetamine, trafficking in heroin, driving without privileges, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (R., pp.46–48.) The State also charged him as a persistent violator. (R., pp.47–48.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Mr. Palmer pled guilty to an amended charge of
possession of a controlled substance (heroin) with the intent to deliver. (R., p.51; Tr. Vol. I,1 p.5,
L.21–p.6, L.10, p.9, Ls.5–9, p.10, L.15–p.11, L.4; see also R., pp.54–55 (amended information).)
The State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. (R., p.51; see also R., pp.56, 58 (motion and
order to dismiss).) Sentencing recommendations were left open. (R., p.51.)
On July 13, 2018, the district court held a sentencing hearing. (R., pp.64–65.) The State
recommended a sentence of ten years, with five years fixed. (Tr. Vol. I, p.18, Ls.5–7.)
Mr. Palmer requested the district court place him on probation, with local jail time, or retain
jurisdiction. (Tr. Vol. I, p.19, Ls.12–14, p.20, Ls.18–23.) Mr. Palmer also requested an
underlying sentence of no more than seven years. (Tr. Vol. I, p.21, Ls.2–4.) The district court
imposed a sentence of seven years, with two and one-half years fixed. (Tr. Vol. I, p.24, L.25–
p.25, L.3.) The district court declined to retain jurisdiction. (Tr. Vol. I, p.25, Ls.3–4.)
Five days after sentencing, Mr. Palmer moved for reconsideration of his sentence under
Rule 35. (R., p.70.) He included four letters of support. (Presentence Investigation Report (PSI),2
pp.72–76.) On August 1, 2018, the district court entered a judgment of conviction, and on
August 15, 2018, the district court entered an amended judgment of conviction. (R., pp.72–73,
74–75.) On August 23, 2018, Mr. Palmer filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.78–80.) On
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There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the entry of plea and
sentencing hearings. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the Rule 35 motion hearing.
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November 2, 2018, the district court held a hearing on Mr. Palmer’s Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.96–
97; see generally Tr. Vol. II, p.5, L.6–p.18, L.18.) The district court denied the motion. (Tr. Vol.
II, p.18, Ls.6–8; R., pp.94.)

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of seven
years, with two and one-half years fixed, upon Mr. Palmer, following his guilty plea to
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Palmer’s Rule 35 motion?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Seven Years,
With Two And One-Half Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Palmer, Following His Guilty Plea To
Possession Of A Controlled Substance With The Intent To Deliver
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Palmer’s sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A) (maximum of life imprisonment). Accordingly, to show
that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Palmer “must show that the sentence, in light
of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand,
137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
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Citations to the PSI refer to the seventy-six-page electronic document with the confidential
exhibits.
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“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
“The primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial court to
gain additional information regarding the defendant’s rehabilitative potential and suitability for
probation.” State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 677 (Ct. App. 2005). “[P]robation is the ultimate
objective of a defendant who is on retained jurisdiction.” Id. The district court’s decision to
retain jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. “There can be no abuse of discretion
in a trial court’s refusal to retain jurisdiction if the court already has sufficient information upon
which to conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation.” Id. Similarly,
“[t]he choice of probation, among available sentencing alternatives, is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court . . . .” State v. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615 (Ct. App. 1990).
In this case, Mr. Palmer asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends the district
court should have sentenced him to a lesser fixed term of imprisonment, retained jurisdiction, or
placed him on probation in light of the mitigating factors, including his substance abuse issues,
recent relapse, acceptance of responsibility and remorse, and willingness to get treatment.
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Mr. Palmer’s substance abuse issues, the impact of his substance abuse on his behavior,
and his need for treatment are strong factors in mitigation. A sentencing court should give
“proper consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem.” State v.
Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The impact of substance abuse on the defendant’s criminal
conduct is “a proper consideration in mitigation of punishment upon sentencing.” State v.
Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981). Here,

Mr. Palmer started abusing

drugs and alcohol as a teenager. (PSI, pp.15–16.) His drug use coincided with him running away
and living on his own after six different foster homes. (PSI, p.11.) Eventually, in his thirties,
Mr. Palmer got sober. (Tr. Vol. I, p.21, Ls.14–15, p.23, Ls.22–24.) He was sober for about ten
years. (Tr. Vol. I, p.23, Ls.22–24.) Unfortunately, Mr. Palmer relapsed, culminating with the
instant offense. (Tr. Vol. I, p.23, L.23.) He was diagnosed with a severe substance abuse
disorder. (PSI, p.24.) Mr. Palmer’s substance abuse issues, ten years of sobriety, and recent
relapse support a more lenient sentence for the instant drug offense.
Moreover, Mr. Palmer accepted responsibility for his actions and was amenable to
treatment. Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in favor of mitigation.
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). Mr. Palmer wanted get sober to “be productive in
society,” “to succeed in life,” and be there for his daughter. (PSI, p.28.) He knew he made a
mistake, apologized to the courts, and asked “for help to move on with my life.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.21,
Ls.15–18.) He wrote to the district court:
I first off want to take accountability for my actions. Over the past year I have
seen the results of my addiction, and not only how it has affected me, but how it
also has affected those in my life. I have come to the realization that I can’t quit
my addiction to drugs on my own, but that I have to humble myself and ask for
help.
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(Aug. R., p.1.) To this end, Mr. Palmer put together a probation plan to get treatment in the
community, a stable residence, and employment. (Tr. Vol. I, p.19, Ls.16–19; Aug. R., pp.1–3.)
Mr. Palmer lived in Montana and wanted to return, but he understood he would have to live in
Idaho while his interstate compact application was pending. (PSI, pp.11–12, Tr. Vol. I, p.19,
Ls.19–22.) As such, he arranged for a stable residence and full-time work in both Idaho and
Montana. (Aug. R., pp.2–3.) Mr. Palmer was also ready for treatment. (Tr. Vol. I, p.21, Ls.7–12.)
He had never completed a substance abuse program before. (PSI, p.16; Tr. Vol. I, p.21, Ls.10–
11; Aug. R., p.1.) He had found two outpatient treatment programs, wanted to get a sponsor and
go to AA/NA meetings, and would take drug tests. (Aug. R., pp.2–3.) In light of his remorse,
acceptance of responsibility, and amenability towards treatment, the district court should have
imposed a lesser sentence.
In summary, Mr. Palmer argues the district court did not exercise reason and thus abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. Proper consideration of the mitigating factors
supported a lesser fixed term, a period of retained jurisdiction, or a suspended sentence with
probation.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Palmer’s Rule 35 Motion
“A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed
to the sound discretion of the court.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014). In
reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must “consider the entire record and
apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence.” Id. The
Court “conduct[s] an independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Burdett,
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134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). “Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce
a sentence under Rule 35,” the Court’s scope of review “includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce.” State v.
Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant
must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
203 (2007).
In this case, Mr. Palmer provided new and additional information to the district court that
showed his sentence was excessive. First, Mr. Palmer provided four letters of support. (PSI,
pp.72–76.) In one letter, his father asked the district court to consider a drug treatment program
for his son. (PSI, p.72.) His father explained Mr. Palmer had a difficult life, and his father took
the blame for being “a criminal and a drug addict” when Mr. Palmer was a child. (PSI, p.72.) His
father stated Mr. Palmer entered foster care after his parents went to prison. (PSI, p.72.) His
father further explained:
At that point in time, he had already been traumatized as much as a child could
possibly be,…[sic] He also had ADHD, and a learning disability, and was given
medications to help. The crucial time when he was a child and teenager, no one
was there for him. He had no help, and no guidance, and no support. Ultimately,
Daniel ended up living in the streets, with a fifth grade education and a minimum
wage job, and he started using drugs.
(PSI, p.72.) Mr. Palmer’s father asked the district court to consider his “rough start in life” and
impose a more lenient sentence. (PSI, p.72.) Mr. Palmer’s brother also wrote a letter of support.
(PSI, p.73.) His brother described their difficult childhood as well. (PSI, p.73.) He asked the
district court to help Mr. Palmer overcome his addiction with a drug treatment program. (PSI,
p.73.) Next, Mr. Palmer’s aunt wrote a letter that similarly informed the district court of his
traumatic childhood. (PSI, pp.74–75.) She acknowledged that nearly all family members had a
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drug problem at some point in their life. (PSI, p.74.) She stated Mr. Palmer never had a stable
home with his biological family, and all of his legal troubles were related to drugs. (PSI, pp.74–
75.) She believed he had “a loving heart and gentle disposition and deserve[d] a chance to obtain
the tools for recovery.” (PSI, p.75.) She asked the district court to provide him with the
opportunity for a drug rehabilitation program. (PSI, p.75.) Finally, a friend of seven years wrote
Mr. Palmer was a helpful and good-hearted person. (PSI, p.76.) She believed he could change his
negative habits, and she would support him. (PSI, p.76.) These four letters of support
demonstrated the district court should have imposed a more lenient sentence or retained
jurisdiction.
In addition to these letters, Mr. Palmer provided testimony in support of his Rule 35
motion. He informed the district court that he had not received any disciplinary sanctions since
his incarceration. (Tr. Vol. II, p.7, Ls.14–16.) He also enrolled in treatment classes. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.7, Ls.17–22.) If released on probation, he had a residence and full-time construction job set up.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.7, L.23–p.8, L.11.) He also had treatment options in the community for his
substance abuse and mental health issues. (Tr. Vol. II, p.8, L.17–p.9, L.1.) Mr. Palmer requested
the district court retain jurisdiction in order to participate in its drug treatment program and
become a productive member of society. (Tr. Vol. II, p.9, Ls.8–22.) He wanted to learn the tools
to be able to participate in recovery in the community. (Tr. Vol. II, p.16, Ls.3–6.) This new and
additional information also stood in favor of leniency.
In light of this information, the district court did not exercise reason and therefore abused
its discretion by denying Mr. Palmer’s Rule 35 motion. This new and additional information
showed Mr. Palmer’s sentence was excessive.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Palmer respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court judgment of conviction
or order denying his Rule 35 motion and remand his case for a new sentencing or Rule 35 motion
hearing.
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2019.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of March, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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